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We identify and analyze statistical regularities and irregularities in the recent order flow of different
NASDAQ stocks, focusing on the positions where orders are placed in the orderbook. This includes
limit orders being placed outside of the spread, inside the spread and (effective) market orders.
We find that limit order placement inside the spread is strongly determined by the dynamics of
the spread size. Most orders, however, arrive outside of the spread. While for some stocks order
placement on or next to the quotes is dominating, deeper price levels are more important for other
stocks. As market orders are usually adjusted to the quote volume, the impact of market orders
depends on the orderbook structure, which we find to be quite diverse among the analyzed stocks
as a result of the way limit order placement takes place.
I. INTRODUCTION
The progress in information technology always has a
huge impact on stock markets and related systems. It
affects not only the trading process itself, but also the
availability of data, the tools used for their analysis and
the model building that follows. The accessibility of de-
tailed order flow data capturing order book dynamics is
useful for researchers and practitioners. Apart from an
understanding of financial markets, long term research
questions concern systemic issues, such as the usefulness
of (de)regulations of financial markets [1], and the con-
sequences of high frequency trading for market stability
[2–4]. Practitioners investigate the profitability of trad-
ing strategies [4]. From both viewpoints, systemic and
practical, an improvement of agent based models [5–7]
exploiting order flow analysis is desirable.
While stylized facts of price time series are entrenched
for decades [8], comparable knowledge on the level of
order book dynamics has not yet been established, for
a comprehensive review see [9]. As the variability of
results is at least partly due to the non-stationarity of
markets, empirical findings have to be steadily reviewed
with respect to their validity for contemporary data [10].
For example, in NASDAQ stocks in 2002 large portions
of all limit orders are placed far from the quotes [11].
In contrast, later studies find a dominating role of the
quotes and suggest queue models for characterizing the
execution sequence of limit orders [12]. If there are sub-
stantial differences in the order flow of different stocks at
the same time in the same market, this has implications
for the description of the market on the systemic level.
When analyzing stock interactions [13–17], one has to be
aware of heterogeneous order flow mechanisms for differ-
ent stocks. This aspect was not sufficiently investigated
so far, maybe partly because the movement of the mar-
ket has been found to be dominated by collective effects
[18].
Here we analyze order flow data of 96 NASDAQ stocks
in early 2016. We focus on where orders are placed
in the order book, and compare statistical regularities
across stocks. We find a rich variety of spread widths,
order placement measures and price returns caused by
single market orders. Further we search for a clustering
of stocks, grouping together stocks with similar behavior.
This study is organized as follows: In Sec. II we de-
scribe the data. In Sec. III we reconstruct market or-
ders from the data, and investigate the prices at which
limit orders enter the order book. These prices help us
to cluster the stocks into groups with similar behavior.
The significance of this grouping with respect to liquid-
ity measures as the spread size, number of orders on the
quotes, and share of market orders among all orders is
investigated. We find striking differences for the returns
caused by single market orders for different groups of
stocks. Finally, in Sec. IV we summarize our results and
give an outlook.
II. DATA
We analyze the data Historical TotalView-ITCH from
NASDAQ US. We group the data into the order
flows of each stock on one specific day. For example
20160307 AAPL comprises of the orders for Apple shares
(the ticker is AAPL) on the NASDAQ US on March,
7 2016 (a Monday). Our data comprise five days from
March, 7 2016 to March, 11 2016. Out of the 100 stocks
listed in the NASDAQ 100 in this period [19], four stocks
are not available in [20], and therefore cannot be included
in our analysis. The data contain information about limit
orders being placed, deleted, partially canceled, partially
traded and fully traded. Moreover, they contain infor-
mation about trades against hidden orders. A detailed
description of the data can be found in [21].
We analyze data from times between 10:00 am and
3:30 pm (New York time). These are the regular trad-
ing times of the NASDAQ excluding the first and last 30
minutes. We neglect these, because order flow dynamics
at the opening and closing of the market have different
statistical properties. All events have a time stamp in
milliseconds. Events happening in the same millisecond
have the same time stamp, although they may not have
happened simultaneously. Chronological order is main-
tained, as incoming orders are processed by the market
in the same succession as in which they arrive.
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2Our data reveal several characteristics of limit orders,
order book dynamics and trades. However, the data only
shows the net effect of a trader’s action in terms of simple
limit orders and trades. Exotic orders appear in a rich
variety, making it impossible to fully reconstruct them
from the order flow [22]. The only exception are market
orders. These will be reconstructed from successive trade
events due to their high relevance for our research goal.
This can of course only be done approximately. In our
reconstruction, we can not distinguish real market orders
from effective market orders, i.e. limit orders crossing
the spread. The data was tested to be free of internal
contradictions, as also reported in other works [23, 24].
III. RESULTS
In Sec. III A we perform the reconstruction of market
orders, as one market order can trigger many consecu-
tive trades, and this information is not provided in the
data. Further we neglect market orders which are solely
traded against hidden limit orders. The share of market
orders among all orders is calculated separately for dif-
ferent stocks, as well as similar measures characterizing
limit orders. In Sec. III B we discuss statistical regular-
ities of in-spread limit orders and use them to perform
a clustering of stocks into groups with similar behavior.
We test in how far the stocks within the same group also
show similar properties according to order counts per day.
In Sec. III C we see that the grouping of stocks accord-
ing to in-spread limit orders is also relevant for off-spread
limit orders. Finally, in Sec. III D, we analyze the impact
of single market orders, again considering the grouping
found for in-spread limit order placements.
A. Market Order Reconstruction and General
Statistics
Our data do not explicitly include market orders, thus
we have to reconstruct them from the trade events. Our
reconstruction modifies the approach of [25]. We trace
subsequent trades to a single market order if all limit or-
ders possibly traded against this market order are of the
same type (for example sell). For trades against hidden
limit orders, the type is unknown, so we include such
trades in the market order reconstruction without dis-
criminating sell or buy type. Apart from that we require
that events of a different type do not come in between
the trades, as for example a limit order arrival or cancel-
lation, and that partially traded limit orders can only be
the last event. Finally we require that all trade events
take place within a time window of fixed length. Accord-
ing to the market specification [26], the order “execution
time is less than one millisecond.” This statement sug-
gests that a consolidation of trade events should be only
taken into account as long as the time stamp difference
between the first and the last trade of a market order is
at most one millisecond. We call the number of trades
triggered by one market order “cluster size”. This termi-
nology (“cluster” denoting a group of trades) discussed
here has nothing to do with the clustering discussed in
the upcoming chapters.
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FIG. 1. Distribution of the cluster size (number of trades
consolidated to one market order) for 20160307 AAPL
Figure 1 shows the distribution of these cluster sizes for
20160307 AAPL. We find that 58% of all market orders
result in only one single trade. However, there are also
groups of up to more than 80 trades against one market
order. We checked the robustness of our reconstruction
with respect to the maximum time difference allowed be-
tween the first and the last trade of a market order. There
are only minor changes in the number of market orders,
even if we increase the maximum time window from one
millisecond to half a second. The respective changes in
the distribution of cluster sizes are barely visible com-
pared to the distribution in Fig. 1. For that reason the
distributions for other maximum time windows are not
shown here.
Moreover, for every group of N trade events possi-
bly considered due to one market order, between one
and N market orders might have triggered this series of
events. This problem can not be unambiguously solved
with help of our data. However, as we will see in the
sequel, given that the number of potential market orders
is much smaller than the number of limit order insertions
and deletions, we may assume that two market orders ar-
riving subsequently without being interrupted by a limit
order placement or deletion is a very rare incident. Thus,
if allowed by the other constraints, we cluster all multiple
trade events to one market order.
There are market orders that can not be assigned to
either buy or sell type. This happens for trades exe-
cuted exclusively against hidden orders. In the upcoming
study, we have to dismiss these market orders. We calcu-
late the frequency of undirected market orders among all
market orders for the order flow of one stock on one day,
and repeat this for all 96 stocks on all five days, result-
ing in a number of 480 relative frequencies. We find that
the proportion of undirected market orders among all
3market orders is on average around 12%. The scattering
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FIG. 2. Box-Whisker-Plots for the relative frequencies of
undirected market orders among all market orders (MOU),
market orders among all orders (MO), active limit orders
among all limit orders (ACT) and in-spread limit orders
among all limit orders (SPRD).
of this quantity over the different data sets is presented
with a Box-Whisker plot in Fig. 2 on the left (MOU).
The white horizontal line in the gray box indicates the
above mentioned average of 12%. The gray box indicates
both centered quartiles, so we see that half of the data is
concentrated within the range 6.6% to 16.1%. The anten-
nas reach up to the largest (smallest) data point within
1.5 times the interquartile range added (subtracted) to
the upper (lower) quartile. The additional dots outside
of the antennas correspond to the outliers: There are a
few data sets in which a certain stock had a particularly
high frequency of undirected market orders on a certain
day. Altogether we find that for most of the data sets,
meaningful information can be extracted from the mar-
ket orders. The rejected undirected market orders only
constitute a small fraction of all market orders.
In the second Box-Whisker plot labeled with MO, we
see that the relative frequency of market orders among
all orders is rather small with an average of about 3.7%.
Here, the regularity along our data sets is much stronger
than it was for the relative amount of undirected mar-
ket orders (MOU). We checked that the volume stored
in the order book does neither systematically increase
nor decrease throughout the day. Thus, either order vol-
umes or limit order deletions have to compensate that
the number of orders providing liquidity, i.e. limit or-
ders, is much higher than the number of orders taking
liquidity, i.e. market orders. We find that most limit
orders are deleted. On average, only 4.4% of all limit
orders per data set are (at least partially) traded, cf. the
Box-Whisker plot labeled as ACT. This means that the
majority of limit orders is deleted without participating
in the trading process. Trading is obviously not the pre-
dominant factor that clears orders from the order book.
This is also known from earlier studies [9]. The relative
frequency of orders that end up being deleted among all
incoming orders is one of the quantities that clearly re-
flect non-stationarity of markets, see for example [27],
where only 10% of all limit orders are reported to be
deleted (without at least partial execution) on the Paris
stock exchange in 2002.
Finally, we are interested in the relative frequency of
in-spread limit orders among all limit orders. The mean
relative frequency of in-spread limit orders is 8.5%. The
Box-Whiskers plot labeled SPRD shows that this relative
frequency varies stronger within the data sets as com-
pared to those frequencies discussed before. The most ob-
vious reason to expect differences for this quantity among
different data sets is the fact that the spread does not al-
ways allow in-spread limit orders. We will return to that
point in Sec. III B.
B. In-spread Limit Orders
We analyze the aggressiveness of in-spread limit orders,
i.e. how close they are placed to the opposing quote.
Hence, we evaluate the distribution of the relative price
p˜ =
p− pq
s
,
where pq denotes the price of the quote on the same side
and s denotes the size of the spread, both at the time
where the limit order is placed. For sell and buy limit
orders, small p˜ implies a small aggressiveness of the order,
moving the quote only slightly. We calculate for each of
the 96 stocks the in-spread relative price distributions
over all five days. Examples of such distributions are
depicted in Fig. 3(ace) for three stocks. The distribution
for Apple (AAPL) has a dominant sharp peak at p˜ = 1/2.
As we will see below, this is because the spread mostly
only opens for one tick, and this one tick is then the only
possible choice for placing an in-spread limit order. The
relative price distributions are very diverse for different
stocks.
To find groups of stocks with similar behavior, we com-
pare relative price distributions for pairs of stocks. A
robust way to deal with mixed distributions containing
sharp peaks is to use the cumulative distribution. Cal-
culating the maximum over all possible values of the dif-
ference between two cumulative distributions, we obtain
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) distance measure. As a
result of the stationarity of these distributions over the
five days of our observations, we can use the average dis-
tribution for each stock without loss of information. The
KS distance is shown in Fig. 4 for all pairs of stocks.
The ordering of stocks is carried out with a clustering of
stocks using the relational k-means algorithm [28], with
the KS distances as an input. The relational k-means
algorithm partitions the stocks into k clusters, such that
distances between stocks in the same cluster are small
[28], and therefore stocks in the same cluster are simi-
lar. As a consequence, a pair of stocks with a large KS
distance is most likely separated into different clusters.
With help of the mean silhouette information criterion
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FIG. 3. Distributions of relative prices of in-spread limit orders (abc) and spread sizes prior to in-spread limit orders (def) for
three data sets in different clusters. We choose to work with the data sets AAPL ((ad), cluster C1), CERN ((be), cluster C2)
and GOOG ((cf), cluster C4) on the day 20160307.
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FIG. 4. Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance matrix of in-spread
order relative price distributions of our 96 stocks. The stocks
were rearranged so that the clustering structure is visible,
with clusters denoted C1, C2, C3 and C4.
[29], we find that a number of four clusters is most ap-
propriate to work with. The sizes of the clusters are as
follows: 33% of the stocks belong to cluster C1, 21%,
26% and 20% of the data sets belong to the clusters C2,
C3 and C4, respectively.
Stocks in the same cluster have similar distributions of
relative prices. In fig. 3 we show distributions for repre-
sentative stocks out of three of the clusters. As a result
of the condition of times immediately before a limit order
is placed in-spread, the minimum spread size observed is
two ticks, although the spread size may equal only one
tick for most of the time per day. As discussed above, the
distribution shown in Fig. 3(a) is essentially a sharp peak
at 0.5. In Fig. 3(d) we see that the spread is mostly only
two ticks wide, before a new limit order arrives inside
the spread. We adjusted the bin size to the tick size of
one cent. By multiplying the density with the bin width
we find that the probability for having a spread of two
ticks is 97%. In this case, the relative price can only be
p˜ = 0.5. Stocks in our first cluster typically have a small
spread. Such stocks have also been described as large tick
stocks [12, 30, 31], because the ticks are large compared
to the spread size which liquidity providers are willing
to offer. Instead, there is a large queue of limit orders
waiting on the quotes for being executed, and the order
of execution (according to arrival times) is important for
investment strategies [12]. To which extent this reflects
in the order arrival outside of the spread in the different
clusters found here will be analyzed in Sec. III C.
Cluster C4 also has a clear interpretation, see the dis-
tribution of relative prices in Fig. 3(c). It has a maxi-
mum at the relative price which corresponds to the sec-
ond least aggressive price. The density is decreasing to-
wards higher relative prices. The bin size is chosen bigger
5than the discretization. The corresponding distribution
of spread sizes Fig. 3(f) shows that the spread is usually
so large that relative prices are almost not constrained
by the spread size. Order placements with small aggres-
siveness are favored. A reason could be that traders want
to have execution priority for their limit orders, but they
want to stay close to the current quotes, because under-
cutting favors the liquidity taker. The behavior of stocks
in the fourth cluster is closer to the market situation of
older market studies [32, 33]. Interestingly, both types of
market dynamics exist at the same time in the same mar-
ket in 2016. The small tick stocks only comprise about
1/5 of all stocks for the data we analyze.
Clusters C2 and C3 can be understood as originating
from intermediate and varying spread sizes. The spreads
of stocks in the intermediate clusters are located between
the small spreads of stocks in cluster C1 with strong dis-
cretization effects, and the quasi continuous spreads of
stocks in cluster C4. We consider cluster C2 as an ex-
ample. The data set for CERN considered here is part
of cluster C2, see Fig. 3(b). If the spread is only two
ticks, the relative prices are 0.5. However, sometimes
the spread is larger, allowing for other relative prices.
The fact that we mostly observe relative prices smaller
or equal to 0.5 shows that generally less aggressive limit
order placement is favoured over a more aggressive one.
In the literature, the distribution of relative prices in
the spread is fitted by some analytical probability density
[33]. Although distribution fitting might work well for the
cluster C4, the distributions for the other three clusters
might not be well described that way. Eventually, not
only trader behavior but also conditions set by the spread
size determine the distributions of relative prices, which
makes a unifying characterization difficult.
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FIG. 5. Scatter plot of daily order counts for each data set
vs. the relative frequency of market order among all orders.
The colors and symbols indicate the affiliation of a stock to
one of the four clusters C1 (blue circles), C2 (yellow squares),
C3 (green diamonds) or C4 (red triangles).
Before we turn to the off-spread limit orders, we in-
vestigate to which extent the different characteristics re-
late to the overall market activity for a stock. Figure
5 shows the relative frequency of market orders among
all orders plotted against the daily order counts for each
data set in a scatter plot. The colors and symbols corre-
spond to the different clusters. The following regularity
emerges: In cluster C1 (blue circles), where the typical
spread is small, total order counts tend to be high, while
the relative frequency of market orders among all orders
is rather small. This hints at a strong presence of algo-
rithmic trading in these data sets, since the algorithms
typically imply a high throughput of limit orders [34, 35].
In contrast, stocks in cluster C4 (red triangles) with large
spreads come hand in hand with small order counts and
comparably high relative frequencies of market orders.
This might be due to a weaker presence of algorithmic
traders.
C. Off-spread Limit Orders
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FIG. 6. Scatter plot of relative frequencies buy and sell of
limit orders placed on the quotes. The colors represent the
cluster to which the relative price distribution of the respec-
tive data set was assigned. Symbols and color coding as in
Fig. 5.
We give an overview of the different characteristics of
placements of off-spread limit orders by analyzing the rel-
ative frequency of limit orders being placed on the quotes
among all off-spread limit orders for each stock. It is
known and consistently reported for about at least 20
years that this is where most of the incoming limit or-
ders arrive [9, 36]. We compute the relative frequency
for buy and sell orders on each of the 480 data sets sep-
arately, see Fig. 6. All data points scatter along the
line of equality, indicating a buy-sell symmetry for this
quantity. Although the clustering is done with respect
to the in-spread limit orders, it is reflected in these rela-
tive frequencies for off-spread limit orders as well. High-
est relative frequencies are seen for cluster C1 (blue cir-
cles). Thus especially when the spread is narrow, there
is a high probability for limit orders to be placed on the
quotes. For these stocks, the order flow dynamics is es-
sentially confined to the price levels around the quotes.
At small relative frequencies, the stocks of cluster C4 are
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FIG. 7. Distributions of absolute deviations of in-spread limit orders. The data sets shown in (a) to (d) belong to the clusters
C1 to C4.
found (red triangles). Apparently, when the spread is
broad, limit orders are not so predominantly placed on
the quotes. In Sec. III D, we show how this relates to the
market order impacts. Once more, the two intermediate
clusters C2 (yellow squares) and C3 (green diamonds)
contain those stocks for which the relative frequencies
are on an intermediate level.
Since we are also interested in the distributions where
limit orders are placed with respect to the quotes, we
have to choose the right observable. We employ abso-
lute deviations d˜ = |p − pq|, but relative deviations, ob-
tained by additionally dividing by the quote price, may
be used as well. In the literature, sometimes absolute
deviations [27] and sometimes relative deviations [33] are
considered. Both observables have their advantages and
disadvantages. Especially close to the quotes, a compar-
ison between different data sets is most suited in terms
of absolute deviations d˜. This is so, because the tick size
is constant for all data sets under investigation. On the
other hand, the (pseudo)discretization for relative devi-
ations is different for each stock as a result of division
by the quote prices, which vary by two orders of magni-
tude along our data sets and are not constant themselves
within one data set, either. As our previous results sug-
gest that limit orders are placed dominantly on and pre-
sumably close to the quotes, we prefer to use d˜.
Figure 7 displays the distributions of absolute price de-
viations d˜ for four data sets. Three of those are the same
ones for which we showed the relative prices of in-spread
limit orders. We primarily discuss differences between
AAPL and GOOG. The role of the first bin was already
discussed. It is equal to (up to a normalization factor of
100) the relative frequency for limit orders being placed
on the quotes, roughly 56% for AAPL and decreases for
higher cluster numbers. For GOOG of cluster C4 we have
a relative frequency of around 6%. The level right next
to the quotes contains roughly 14% of all limit orders for
AAPL and around 2% of all limit orders for GOOG. For
AAPL, 75% of all orders are found within the first three
levels, while less than 9% of all orders are found on these
three levels for GOOG. For the latter, the distribution
of absolute price deviations decreases very slowly. Hence,
for the stocks of cluster C1, limit order arrival close to the
quotes is dominant, while the depth of the order book ap-
pears to be more important for the stocks of cluster C4.
Cluster C2 and C3 again feature a transition between the
two extreme scenarios.
In previous studies, power-law behavior was reported
quite consistently across different markets and times
studied [9, 11]. This could still be the case for stocks
7with large spread, especially in cluster C4. Fitting a
power law to our data does not provide convincing re-
sults, maybe due to the short time window of five days.
For stocks with small spreads, especially in cluster C1,
the quotes and their first few neighboring levels are so
dominant, that discretization effects might be too domi-
nant for a universal power law behavior. Including data
of a longer time window is beyond the scope of this study.
Therefore, the characterization of off-spread limit order
prices with appropriate fitting functions is left for future
work.
D. Market Orders
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FIG. 8. Distributions of relative market order volumes for
20160307 AAPL
We proceed as in [32], where gaps in the order book
were found to generate high midpoint returns. The mech-
anism is as follows: The shift of the midpoint after the
arrival of a market order depends on the orders removed
from the order book by that market order. A price shift
occurs if the market order volume is at least as big as
the volume on the corresponding quote. As market or-
der volumes are usually chosen in a way such that only
the volume on the quotes is executed, the price shift, and
therefore the return, depends on the distance between the
quote and the next occupied level behind the quote. We
call the distance between occupied price levels in the or-
der book gaps. The larger the gap behind the quotes, the
larger the impact of a market order. The correspondence
between the gap structure and the returns was not only
found empirically, but was also reproduced by an agent
based model [37]. We will test how these mechanisms
apply to our data.
We define the impact of market orders as
r =
pa − pp
pp
, (1)
where pp is the midpoint price immediately prior to the
market order, and pa is the midpoint price immediately
after the market order. The authors of [32] studied data
from the London Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2002
and found the volumes of market orders and volumes on
the corresponding quotes to be correlated with a cor-
relation coefficient of 0.86. However, this is only true
if only those market orders are taken into account that
change the midpoint. Otherwise, the correlation coef-
ficient drops below 0.01. This is due to a majority of
market orders having a volume below the quote volume.
We find an average correlation per data set of 0.36
when taking into account all market orders, regardless
of having a non-zero impact or not. We consider that
a consequence resulting from a higher amount of mar-
ket orders being adjusted to have a volume equal to the
quote volume, in contrast to [32]. To understand that
correlation in detail, we analyze the distribution of the
relative volumes of market orders. These are defined as
the market orders volumes divided by the quote volume
from which liquidity is removed as the market order is
executed. Thus, a relative volume smaller than one cor-
responds to a market order that does not change the
midpoint, a relative volume equal to one corresponds to
a market order that causes a return determined by the
gap behind the quotes and a relative volume greater than
one corresponds to an impact greater or equal to the gap
behind the quote.
Figure 8 shows such a distribution for the data set
20160307 AAPL. The market order volumes match the
quote volume in roughly 40.5% of all cases. Relative
volumes smaller than one have a probability of 53.1%.
Hence, relative volumes larger than one have a probabil-
ity of 6.4%. These results do not change considerably for
other stocks in our data. This has two important impli-
cations for returns created by single market orders: First,
we expect a high probability of around 53.1% of market
orders to result in zero return. Second, we note that
most of the non-zero returns indeed follow from the gap
behind the quotes. The strong correspondence between
quote volumes and market order volumes indicates that
our market order reconstruction works quite accurately.
Figure 9 shows the distributions of empirical returns
according to Eq. (1) for our data sets. First, we observe
a pseudo-discretization for all four data sets. The mere
discretization is an effect of the tick size of 0.01$. The
pseudo-discretization is due to the changing midpoint, by
which we divide when computing the returns. The au-
thors of [38] deal with this phenomenon in great detail.
We choose our bin size such that the discretization is not
blurred. The number of return levels that show up reflect
the sparseness of the orderbook. We again find qualita-
tive differences with respect to the clusters we identified
in Sec. III B. For AAPL, the order book is densely filled
around the quotes, thus preventing large price jumps of
more than a few ticks. Apparently, the more sparse price
level occupation, we hypothesized to be present for stocks
in cluster C4 like GOOG, results in a broader return dis-
tribution. This distribution is so broad that tick size
effects play a smaller role. Qualitatively, this fits to the
results in [32]. Due to the dense level occupation, the
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FIG. 9. Distributions of returns generated by individual market orders for four stocks. The data sets shown in (a) to (d) belong
to the clusters C1 to C4.
individual impacts tend to shrink as we move to smaller
cluster numbers.
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We analyzed order flow data of 96 NASDAQ stocks in
early 2016 and found remarkable qualitative differences
in the order flow between different stocks. We focused
on where orders are placed in the order book, with three
qualitatively different placement positions for orders: in-
spread, off-spread or crossing the spread. The latter we
referred to as effective market orders. We found that
limit orders were submitted much more frequently than
market orders, and off-spread limit orders were much
more frequent than in-spread limit orders. However,
most limit orders were deleted rather than traded. For
some stocks the small relative frequencies of in-spread
limit orders resulted because the spread usually was equal
to the tick size, out-ruling in-spread limit orders. Further
we found that when the spread tended to be narrow, off-
spread limit orders tended to be placed close to or on the
quotes. When spreads tended to be wider, less off-spread
limit orders arrived near the quotes. Market order vol-
umes were typically adjusted to the quote volume. Thus,
the impact of individual market orders depended on the
orderbook structure, i.e. the impact of a single market
order resulted from the gap behind the spread. When
there was a high occupation density, individual market
order impacts were typically reduced to the tick size (if
there was any impact at all), while when the occupation
density was small, impacts tended to be higher.
With help of the relational k-means clustering algo-
rithm and based on the distributions of relative prices
of in-spread limit orders, we were able to grasp the di-
versity of order flow for different stocks. The diversity
of the relative price distributions of in-spread limit or-
ders could be traced back to the conditions set up by the
spread. The different observables we took into account
portrayed a consistent picture of the diversity: There
were stocks with a high activity in terms of order ar-
rival, where the competition of strategies led to a narrow
spread and densely occupied adjacent levels in the or-
derbook. Therefore, the impact of individual orders was
often constrained to the tick size. At the other end of
the spectrum, spreads were typically large, order place-
ment was not that strongly limited to the levels on and
right next to the quotes, and individual impacts of mar-
9ket orders varied more strongly, as a result of a sparse
occupation of price levels next to the quotes.
Future models, such as agent based models, have to
account for that diversity. It may be doubted that one
model with a fixed set of mechanisms might be able to
reproduce stylized facts for the different kind of dynamics
we observed. Finally, the diversity within a fixed time
window and within one market suggests that averages
over a whole market should be considered carefully.
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